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1. Introduction 
 
Many recent studies have voiced the growing concern that the body of knowledge that springs 
from organisation science is hardly taken notice of in management practice. This has given 
rise to urgent calls for making organisation research more relevant to practitioners and an 
intensive debate on how to realise this aim has set in (e.g. Hodkinson et al. 2001; Rynes et al. 
2001; MacLean/MacIntosh 2002; Baldridge et al. 2004; Van de Ven/Johnson 2006). In most 
of the existing literature one can identify three main reasons for the observable lack of 
connection between organisation research and practice: research is not sufficiently focused on 
the „real‟ problems of practitioners (e.g. Rynes et al. 1999), research results are not properly 
disseminated to practitioners (e.g. Spencer 2001) and the language of science is not properly 
translated into the language practitioners use (e.g. Starkey/Madan 2001; Van de Ven/Johnson 
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2006). The underlying assumption is that if scientists redressed these shortcomings their 
findings would be utilised by practitioners and thus the gap between theory and practice 
would be bridged. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to contrast this recent debate on the relation between science and 
practice with an analysis from the perspective of Niklas Luhmann‟s theory of autopoietic 
systems. According to this perspective, the lack of any transfer of scientific knowledge to 
practice needs to be understood as the inevitable result of the differentiation between 
organisation science and the so-called „management practice‟, which function according to 
different logics. This impedes the transfer of knowledge from the field of science to that of 
practice. Hence, from this perspective the practical irrelevance of management science is not a 
problem that can be resolved. On the contrary, only because of this differentiation, and thus, 
the impossibility of any direct transfer of meaning, can science be as productive as it is. The 
idea of organisation studies as an „applied science‟ is a mere illusion. 
 
This chapter is structured into six sections. After the present introduction, section two will 
introduce the basic elements of Luhmann‟s theory of social systems as autopoietic systems of 
communication. Section three will describe the conceptualisation of science, economy and 
organisation as three different types of social systems that operate according to different 
logics of communication. Section four will deal with the impossibility of any transfer of 
meaning between management science and management practice. As we will see in section 
five, this impossibility does not imply that management science and management practice 
have no impact on each other: science and practice cause in each other mutual „perturbations‟, 
whose meaning is determined by the receiving system. We conclude with some comments on 
the implications of this perspective for research policy. 
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2. Social systems as autopoietic systems of communication 
 
Niklas Luhmann (1927–1998) was one of the most influential sociologists to have drawn on 
the concept of autopoiesis. The two Chilean cognitive biologists Humberto Maturana and 
Francisco Varela had introduced the concept of autopoiesis in the early 1970s to conceptualise 
life, i.e. the aspect that distinguishes what they called a living from a non-living „machine‟ 
(Varela et al. 1974). They write: 
 
An autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of 
production (transformation and destruction) of components which: (i) through their interactions 
and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that 
produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in space in which they 
(the components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network. 
(Maturana/Varela 1980: 78) 
 
Central to the concept of autopoiesis is the idea that a system is produced and reproduced by 
interactive processes among its components. In other words, through its components the 
system reproduces itself.  
 
In contrast to allopoietic systems, none of the elements of autopoietic systems are produced 
by agents external to the system. All processes of autopoietic systems are produced by the 
system itself and all processes of autopoietic systems are processes of self-production. In this 
sense, one can say that autopoietic systems are operatively closed. There are neither elements 
entering the system from outside nor vice versa. A system's operative closure, however, does 
not imply a closed system model. It only implies that no operations can enter or leave the 
system. Autopoietic systems are, nevertheless, also open systems: all autopoietic systems 
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have contact with their environment (interactional openness). Living cells, for example, 
depend on an exchange of energy and matter between themselves and their surroundings, 
without which they could not exist. The contact with the environment, however, is regulated 
by the autopoietic system; the system determines when, what and through what channels there 
is an exchange of energy or matter between itself and the environment (undoubtedly, there are 
some external forces that might influence the system directly, e.g. radioactive radiation, which 
can destroy parts of the system. These influences, however, can never determine what 
operations take place in a system). 
 
Luhmann (1986, 1995) argued that the concept of autopoiesis, if abstracted from its biological 
references, could also be applied to other domains, particularly to the social domain. In 
contrast to other social scientists who used the concept of autopoiesis only metaphorically 
(e.g. Morgan 1997) or who tried to apply it directly to the social domain (e.g. Beer 1980; 
Robb 1989; Zeleny/Hufford 1992), Luhmann first abstracted it into a general concept on a 
transdisciplinary level, then redefined it as the specific concept of autopoiesis with reference 
to particular types of non-biological systems (Luhmann 1995; for an overview of different 
applications of autopoiesis to the social domain see Mingers 1995). Apart from living systems 
Luhmann identifies two additional types of autopoietic systems: social systems and psychic 
systems (or minds). While living systems reproduce themselves via biological processes, social 
systems reproduce themselves via communication processes, and psychic systems via mental 
processes. Whereas the elements of living systems are physical substances, those of social and psychic 
systems are elements of meaning. In the following we will concentrate on Luhmann‟s theory of 
social systems. 
 
For Luhmann the elements of social systems are communications (Luhmann 1986, 1995). 
Yet, in contrast to the conventional notion of communication as the transfer of meaning from 
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a sender to a receiver, Luhmann conceptualises it as the unity of three components: (1) 
information, (2) utterance and (3) understanding. „Information‟ refers to the question of what 
is being communicated while „utterance‟ concerns the question of how and why it is  
communicated. Yet, the central component of  communication is „understanding‟, which is 
absent from most other conceptualisations of communication. Understanding is the distinction 
between information and utterance. For a communication to be understood, the information 
has to be distinguished from the utterance: what is being communicated must be distinguished 
from how and why it is communicated. It is the understanding which determines the other two 
components, i.e. the information and the utterance. In this context, Luhmann (1995: 143) 
writes: „Communication is made possible, so to speak, from behind, contrary to the temporal 
course of the process.‟ 
 
Luhmann argues that communication conceptualised as the unity of utterance, information 
and understanding cannot be produced by a human being alone; a single individual might 
produce an utterance containing a particular piece of information but he or she cannot 
contribute the element of understanding as well. This means that it always takes at least two 
individuals to co-produce this unity. Consequently, communication is conceptualised as an 
emergent phenomenon that arises from the contact between different individuals. 
 
Luhmann goes on to explain that how a communication is understood can only be determined from 
communications that follow on as a reaction to the initial one, in the same way that the concrete 
meaning of a word in a text is only defined through the words following it in the text. Or, 
more to the point, the meaning of a communication is the difference that it makes in following 
communications. However, the difference that a communication makes for ensuing 
communications is not determined by the focal communication itself but by the other 
communications. In this sense, Luhmann speaks of communications (i.e. the meaning realised 
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by the communications) as the product of (other) communications and not of individuals 
(Luhmann 2002: 169). 
 
On the basis of this insight, Luhmann unfolds his theory of autopoietic communication 
systems: every communication belongs to a particular communication system (i.e. a network 
of communications) by which it has been produced and in whose reproduction it takes part. 
Examples of such communication systems are organisations or face-to-face interactions. Such 
communication systems are operatively closed. By this he means that communications are 
only produced by the particular networks of communications; they cannot be imported from 
outside those networks. Communication processes are stimulated or triggered from outside (in 
this sense the system can be said to be interactionally open). For example, a thought in the 
mind of an individual might stimulate a communication, but it is the network of 
communication itself that, in reaction to it, produces – according to its own logic of 
reproduction – a particular communication. As Luhmann writes: 
 
The mind cannot instruct communication, because communication constructs itself. But the 
mind is a constant source of impulses for the one or the other turn of the operative process 
inherent in communication. (Luhmann, 2002: 176–177) 
 
In other words, communication systems do react to external impulses but they react to them 
according to their own internal logic; external impulses might trigger certain communicative 
processes but they cannot determine from outside what internal processes are triggered. In this 
sense external impulses constitute merely unspecific „perturbations‟ (Luhmann 1995). 
 
Luhmann distinguishes between three types of different social systems: organisation, face-to-
face interaction, and society. Each of these types of systems reproduces itself on the basis of a 
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different type of communication. Organisation is a social system that reproduces itself on the 
basis of decision communications (Luhmann 2003, 2005b). Face-to-face interactions are 
systems that reproduce themselves on the basis of communications that reflect the physical 
presence of the participants. Finally, society is the all-encompassing social system that 
comprises all interconnected communications.  
 
According to Luhmann we have only one world society ( except for a handful of tiny societies 
that  live in complete isolation from the global population, such as certain bush tribes) as all 
communications in the world are interconnected in some way. What is typical of the modern 
society is its differentiation into several functional (sub-)systems, i.e. systems that fulfil 
particular societal functions: e.g. the economic system, the system of science, the legal 
system, the political system, the system of religion and the system of education. Each of these 
sub-systems reproduces itself on the basis of a particularly coded communication; that is to 
say, each communication carries a particular code, which identifies that communication as 
belonging to a particular function system and determines what kind of meaning is being 
processed (Luhmann 1989). For example, the economic system processes communications 
that carry the code „revenue/expense‟, while the legal system carries the code 
„legality/illegality‟. In this sense, the communications of these two systems only process 
meanings about revenue/expense and legality/illegality respectively. Other functional systems 
carry other codes, and thus process different meanings. In the following section we will 
elaborate on this further. 
 
3. Science, economy and organisation as three different types of systems 
 
In order to examine the relation between management science and management practice it is 
necessary to identify the relevant social systems and to analyse their different logics of 
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communication. Management science belongs to the functional system of science. 
Management practice, however, cannot be so clearly allocated to any particular functional 
system; „practice‟ is not a system in the way that science is. What is usually referred to as 
„management practice‟ corresponds at least to two kinds of systems: the economic system and 
the system of organisation. In the following we will analyse the mode of operation of these 
systems in more detail. 
 
As described above, the system of science and the economic system are functional sub-
systems of society. These subsystems are themselves operatively closed with regard to each 
other in the sense that each reproduces itself on the basis of a particularly coded 
communication. Communications within the system of science carry the code true/false 
(Luhmann 1989, 1990). That is to say, in order to be considered part of a „scientific‟ 
discourse, a communication has to refer to earlier scientific communications as either true or 
false; and it must also be possible for ensuing communications to refer to this communication 
as either true or false. In this sense, the meaning of a communication within a scientific 
discourse is basically its truth or falsity, to which further communications can refer in order to 
affirm their veracity (which may then be rejected by yet further communications). One of the 
clearest examples of this is the tendency of scientific publications to reference other scientific 
publications in order to claim their own truth-value (cf. Kieser 2002: 208). Kieser explains: 
 
Operations of science always refer to other operations within this system. For 
example, a scientific publication always refers to other scientific publications – to 
theoretical concepts and methods it builds on and develops further. (Kieser and Wellstein 2008: 
507) 
 
Drawing on Luhmann, Nicolai writes 
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Science is from this perspective a web of communications that reproduces, on the basis of 
scientific communication, further scientific communication in turn. (Nicolai 2004: 956) 
 
Whether a scientific communication is classified as „true‟ or „false‟ is itself entirely 
determined by the criteria of the scientific discourse; a „true‟ scientific communication, in this 
sense, is a communication that has been accepted by the other scientific communications as 
„true‟ – it is a „coded truth‟. 
 
The scientific system is operatively closed in that scientific communication is only produced 
by the network of other scientific communications. Scientific communication cannot draw on 
non-scientific communications in order to substantiate any scientific claims. For example, a 
communication that was substantiated with reference to a newspaper article would be 
considered unscientific and thus not be incorporated in the network of scientific 
communications. The processing of scientific communications is guided by theories and 
methodologies that constitute the structures (or  „programme‟) of the scientific system. 
Theories and methodologies define the „rules‟ of what constitutes an acceptable scientific 
communication; i.e. they define how scientific communications can be related to other 
scientific communications, and thus, ultimately, whether or not a particular communication is 
treated as true or false, or whether it should be ignored as unscientific. They also determine 
how to construct scientific communications from empirical observations. Different theories 
and methodologies will lead to different scientific communications. In line with the concept 
of autopoiesis, the theories and methodologies are not introduced from outside but are 
themselves the product of scientific communications. New theories and methodologies are 
developed on the basis of existing theories and methodologies. Whether or not new theories 
and methodologies are considered true or false, and thus whether one can substantiate further 
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scientific communications depends, entirely on the network of scientific communications 
(Luhmann 1990). 
 
As a consequence of this, scientific discourses are necessarily highly „stylised‟ 
(Astley/Zammuto 1992); they construct abstract variables that are meaningful only in a scientific 
context as they have mostly very little to do with how the „same‟ phenomena are treated 
elsewhere. An example of this is the way in which the concepts of „performance‟ and „success 
factors‟ are constructed in the management sciences (March /Sutton 1997). In addition to the 
construction of idiosyncratic variables, the scientific discourse forces a communication also into 
relating its variables to each other in an idiosyncratic manner. Thus, within the scientific discourse, 
a phenomenon is structured differently from the way in which it would be structured within 
any other discourse. To give an example, within the scientific discourse, one assumes 
explicitly counter-factual situations and works with ceteris paribus clauses. As Luhmann 
writes: 
 
The assumption of ceteris paribus is the condition of isolating the objects of research, but like 
the presuppositions of model-formation it is a consciously false assumption. Only through false 
assumptions can true knowledge be attained. (Luhmann 1989: 81) 
 
That is to say, science structures phenomena in such a way as to render them subject to the 
scientific criteria that determine truth and falsity. 
 
In contrast to the science system, the economic system is not guided by the code true/false but 
by that of revenue/expense – or simply payment/non-payment (Luhmann 1988, 1989). More 
specifically, as Luhmann explains 
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By the economy we mean all those operations transacted through the payment of money. 
Whenever money is involved, directly or indirectly, the economy is involved regardless of who 
makes the payment and whose needs are affected. (Luhmann 1989: 51) 
 
An economic communication is, for example, the placing of an order. In this case the meaning 
of the communication for further economic communications is not its truth or falsity but the 
payment associated with it. Other economic communications connect to this communication 
with regard to its effects on payment. The communication may be rejected by ensuing 
communications, if it is considered to lead to increasing expense (i.e. to be unprofitable), or, 
conversely, it may be accepted, if considered to lead to increasing revenues (i.e. to be 
profitable). Again, what qualifies as profitable/unprofitable is determined entirely by the 
economic discourse itself. As in the case of the scientific system, the processing of economic 
communications is guided by specific structures. The structures of the economic system are 
budgets and balances. They define the rules for economic communication and determine what 
money can be spent for what purposes. Again, these structures are not introduced from 
outside but are themselves the product of the economic communications. 
 
The third type of system that needs to be examined is the organisation. Unlike the other two 
systems (science and economy), organisations belong to a type that is very different from that 
of functional sub-systems of society. As described above, organisations are systems that 
reproduce themselves on the basis of decision communications. To appreciate this it is 
necessary to clarify Luhmann‟s concept of decision (Luhmann 2000, 2005b). In contrast to 
other conceptualisations of decision-making in the literature, for Luhmann decisions are 
decision communications; it is not that decisions are first made and then communicated.  
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Decisions are a very peculiar form of communication: they are „compact communications‟ 
(Luhmann 2000: 185) which communicate their own contingency. In contrast to an „ordinary‟ 
communication, which only communicates a specific content that has been selected (e.g. „I 
love you‟), a decision communicates also – explicitly or implicitly – that there are alternatives 
that could have been selected instead (e.g. „We are buying machine A and not machine B‟). 
They communicate not only what has been decided but also that it has been decided. This has 
significant implications for the dynamics of decisions. In the transition from one decision to the 
next the uncertainty of the first decision situation – i.e. the uncertainty about the consequences of the 
given alternatives – disappears. For the second decision it is irrelevant what the initial decision 
situation looked like. The second decision can take the chosen alternative as a clear point of 
reference without having to evaluate the first decision situation; i.e., the first decision has 
been „decided‟ and does not have to be „decided‟ once more. As such, every decision makes 
possible extremely complex decision processes by producing stable points of reference for 
ensuing decisions. 
 
As in the case of the other two systems described above, the processing of decisions is guided 
by particular structures, which Luhmann refers to as „decision premises‟. These decision 
premises define what decisions come about. There are different types of decision premises. 
Decision programmes or „plans‟ are such an example: a strategic plan defines e.g. a general 
direction for future decision-making. These decision premises are, again, not introduced from 
outside but are the product of the organisation‟s decision processes. Decision premises result 
themselves from decision processes; e.g. strategic plans are the outcome of decision-making 
processes, which themselves are guided by other decision premises, such as those concerning 
decision-making competences (Luhmann 2005b). 
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The three systems that we have described (science, economy and organisation) are very 
different in the way they process meaning, as has hopefully become clear by now. In the 
following section we will examine what consequences this has for the possibilities of 
transferring meaning from science to „practice‟. 
 
4. The impossibility of transfer of meaning between management science and 
management practice 
 
In the literature it is usually assumed that scientific knowledge can be transferred to the 
domain of practice – at least in principle. From the perspective of social-systems theory this 
is, however, highly questionable. As we have seen in the last section, the three systems 
potentially involved in such a „transfer‟ operate according to different logics because of which 
their respective communications become incommensurate. 
 
The differences between the different communication systems become even clearer when we 
analyse the way they process information (Luhmann 1989; Seidl/Becker 2006). Information 
can generally be defined as „a difference which makes a difference‟ (Bateson 1972: 315). For 
each of the three types of systems there is a different type of „difference that can make a 
difference‟. For the science system it is the difference between truth and falsity; only 
communications that distinguish between true/false have an information value for further 
scientific communications. Analogously to the way that computers can only distinguish 
between 0 and 1, scientific discourses only distinguish between true and false. Other 
distinctions have no information value – they make no difference; they are simply „noise‟. 
Similarly, the economic system can only process information in the form of payment/non-
payment. „True/false‟ as such is not a difference that makes a difference to the economic 
system. Organisations also process meaning in the form of decisions. Decisions can only be 
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substantiated by other decisions (of the same organisation) and might refer to some external 
sources. Ultimately, however, which external sources are drawn upon, and in what way, has to 
be justified by reference to decisions. The only difference that makes a difference to an 
organisation is the absorption of uncertainty. Whether or not something is true or false, or 
whether it constitutes a revenue or expense has no information value as such. What is relevant 
here is whether it provides a source of uncertainty absorption. 
 
Because of their different forms of self-referential information-processing, the 
communications of different systems – here: science, economy and organisations – have 
different meanings in each system and cannot be translated into each other. Luhmann (2005a) 
writes that, in order to transfer a scientific communication into a different social system, it 
would be necessary to transfer also the entire background of theories on which the particular 
communication is based – and the theories on which these theories are based in their turn. In 
other words, it would be necessary to transfer more or less the entire scientific system into the 
other system. But even if this was possible, the meaning of the communication in another system 
would necessarily differ from its meaning in the original system, as the entire complex would be 
interpreted according to a different code.  
 
Drawing on Luhmann‟s systems theory, Kieser and Nicolai (2004) described how the system 
of science constructs the problems that it analyses in a self-referential way that has very little 
to do with the problems faced by practitioners. This is inevitable as the problems are by 
definition framed differently in the domains of science and „practice‟, even if scientists and 
practitioners cooperate. Kieser and Nicolai write: 
 
[T]he negotiation of a problem definition […] has to be seen as a communicative process that 
depends on agreeing on a specific frame of reference. In the case of science, frames of reference 
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are derived from extant theories. In the case of performance studies, sometimes they are 
triggered by a problem that plagues practitioners – for example, by the question of whether the 
existence of formal procedures of strategic planning are correlated with organizational 
performance. Soon, however, the discussion between researchers via their publications creates 
new and different problems, and the problem that initiated the scientific discourse gets lost from 
sight. (Kieser/Nicolai 2004: 276) 
 
Even when it is the same individuals who „participate‟ in the scientific and „practical‟ 
discourses, they cannot transfer meaning from one discourse to another; „their‟ 
communications and actions are determined rather by the logic of the particular 
communication systems (Luhmann 1986). Nicolai (2004) demonstrated this impressively in 
his study of Porter‟s work, which is widely considered a prime example of applied research. 
Rather than crossing the boundaries of the scientific and the „practical‟ discourses, the 
economics-based scientific parts and the „applied‟ parts of Porter‟s work are presented more or 
less autonomously from each other. 
 
Kieser and Nikolai conclude: 
 
In short, in discourses in which researchers try to establish the validity of theories on the basis of 
scientific criteria, science necessarily disconnects itself from discourses in which practitioners 
evaluate the usefulness of a concept. Again, the practice-oriented researcher finds himself or 
herself thrown back on that self-referential stream of communication that is typical for scientific 
discourses and is perceived as detached from the real world. (Kieser/Nicolai 2004: 277) 
  
5. Perturbations between science and practice 
As we have argued in the last section, a direct transfer of scientific results into practice is not 
possible due to the different logics of communication. However, this does not mean that 
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management science is irrelevant to management practice. Both the system of economy in 
general and business organisations in particular are influenced by management science. In this 
sense one can speak of the „practical relevance‟ of science whenever science makes a 
difference to practice – even though it does not make the same difference as it makes for 
science itself. Hence, scientific knowledge can be said to be of relevance to business 
organisations if it has some relevance to decision-making, or more to the point, if it makes a 
difference to decision-making. This is in line with Luhmann‟s conceptualisation of practical 
relevance: 
 
[W]e should analyse the application of scientific results in practice not in terms of action but in 
terms of making decisions. It is not a question of whether something, which from a scientific 
point of view has been acknowledged as correct action, is reproduced correctly or not; rather the 
question is whether the decision situation is modified through the incorporation of a scientific 
result, which may (but doesn‟t have to) affect the ultimately selected alternative. (Luhmann 
1993: 330. My translation; emphasis added) 
 
The particular form of relevance for decision-making can vary. For example, scientific 
knowledge might contribute to defining the decision situation, deciding between alternatives 
or enforcing a decision. Thus, whether a scientific theory is true or not is irrelevant to 
„practice‟; the question is whether the referral to a particular theory helps achieve certain 
aims. Luhmann illustrates this with an example from psychology: 
 
With regard to the question of applicability it is irrelevant whether the Oedipus complex really 
exists; what counts is whether somebody who is skilled in identifying it is able to combine 
situations and therapies in a successful way. (Luhmann 1993: 323; my translation) 
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In contrast to conventional conceptions of the application of scientific knowledge in practice, 
according to which elements of meaning are simply infused into the receiving system, from 
the systems perspective the „application‟ of such knowledge is associated with a change of 
meaning. Once knowledge is „applied‟, the meaning is not the same; it is not even translated. 
It is simply a different meaning that is received in practice. Luhmann (1993: 327) refers to 
this as a „productive misunderstanding‟. Teubner explains: 
 
In a precise sense, interdiscursive translation is impossible. Here lies the paradox of today‟s 
babylonic language confusion. Between the discourses, the continuation of meaning is 
impossible and at the same time necessary. The way out of this paradox is misunderstanding. 
One discourse cannot but reconstruct the meaning of the other in its own terms and context and 
at the same time can make use of the meaning material of the other discourse as an external 
provocation to create internally something new. (Teubner 2000: 408) 
 
As Teubner explains, one system cannot receive input of meaning from another system; it 
merely reconstructs elements of another system according to its own logic. This internal 
reconstruction is, however, its very own construct, which is different from the original one. 
Luhmann writes: 
 
Non-identical reproduction thus means: a change of meaning through re-contextualisation, 
through integration into a new neighbourhood, through triggering of different associations. 
Whether the infused element was true or false quickly loses its relevance. (Luhmann 1993: 330; 
my translation) 
 
From this perspective, the introduction of scientific knowledge into an organisation causes 
within the discourse an unspecific perturbation (Teubner 2000), which elicits reactions from 
the system that are specific to that system. Drawing on Luhmann‟s systems theory, Seidl 
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(2007) argues that what is often described as the introduction of a new concept into an 
organisation is actually just the introduction of a label, the meaning of which is then 
constructed according to particular structures of the organisation. In other words, the 
organisation constructs its own meaning. Empirically, one finds that whenever organisations 
proclaim that they are applying new concepts – either from science or from other external 
systems – there are usually long discussions about how the labels associated with those 
concepts can be interpreted and related to existing practices (cf. Zbaracki 1998). 
Organisations try to make sense of the new labels on the basis of their existing discursive 
structures and in this way create new sense, i.e. new meaning. 
 
Given that the economic system in general and business organisations in particular have such 
different modes of information processing, that they react to scientific communications at all 
is a phenomenon in need of explanation. Rather than being surprised at the fact that scientific 
results have such limited effects on other systems, one should be surprised that they affect 
them at all. An explanation for this is provided by the concept of „structural coupling‟ 
(Maturana 1978; Luhmann 1995). Systems are said to be „structurally coupled‟ if their 
respective structures are adjusted to each other in such a way as to allow systematically for 
mutual perturbations. Thus, structural coupling can explain why systems, despite their 
operative closure (i.e. in spite of the impossibility to exchange elements), remain responsive 
towards other systems in their environment. 
 
The most general form of structural coupling between social systems is language. All social 
systems are structured in such a way as to be able to process language (Luhmann 1995). 
However, every social system does so in a different way. What‟s more, there is a particularly 
close structural coupling between certain areas of the sciences and other systems where they 
share a particular language. For example, in all strategy discourses – whether in the scientific 
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system or business organisations – one finds that more or less the same strategy language is 
used. Every strategy discourse can make (its own) sense of the labels „strategic planning‟, 
„strategy review‟, „strategic forecasting‟ etc. – something that might have no meaning at all in 
other types of discourses. Because of that, different strategy discourses have particularly 
strong „resonance‟ (Luhmann 1989) with regard to each other – where „resonance‟ means that 
a system reacts to external events in accordance with its own logic (Luhmann 1989: 145). 
 
The degree of resonance with regard to scientific communications in a particular organisation 
varies with the degree to which the organisation‟s structures are „aligned‟ with the structures 
of the scientific system. While some organisations take almost no notice of scientific results, 
other organisations adjust their structures explicitly to the structures of the science system. A 
good example of this are consulting firms, which try to stay in close „contact‟ with the 
developments in management science. In other words, they couple themselves structurally to 
the system of science. Because of that, new developments in management science have a 
particular resonance in many consulting firms; i.e. such developments can be seen as a 
difference that makes a difference to consulting firms, even though – this needs to be stressed 
again – each consulting firm determines by itself what difference this makes. Often this might 
amount to no more than using a particular scientific label to enforce a particular decision 
(Kieser 2002).   
 
Apart from coupling themselves structurally to the system of science, consulting firms often 
also function as means of structural coupling between science and other organisations. Thus, 
not only do the consulting firms possess resonance with particular developments in science 
but they can also serve as a means of creating resonance within other organisations. This is 
the case if organisations couple themselves structurally – as clients – to consulting firms (on 
the consultant–client relation see Luhmann 2005a; Mohe/Seidl 2007) that are themselves 
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coupled to the scientific system. In this way certain scientific findings, e.g. the identification 
of a new „success factor‟ in science, might have some resonance in the consulting firm in the 
sense that the firm changes its concepts of consulting, which might have an effect on what 
perturbation these concepts cause in the client. Such effects might take different forms, and 
consist in something as simple as e.g. the adoption of new scientific labels that are (re-
)constructed by the consultants and clients respectively. 
 
What meaning is ultimately created within a particular organisation in reaction to the 
introduction of a new label is not completely random. Rather, the particular communicative 
context, i.e. the particular structures of communication into which the new labels become 
embedded, restrict the range of possible meanings that may be attached to the labels. This is 
particularly the case where there is a whole set of labels to accommodate. In these cases the 
interpretation of every individual label has to fit with the interpretation of the other labels – 
unless, that is, one only selectively draws on individual labels (cf. Zbaracki 1998). 
 
It is impossible to determine from the outset what meaning will ultimately be created in 
response to a perturbation from the scientific system. As Teubner writes: 
 
There is of course, no built-in guarantee that such a misunderstanding will be productive. You 
cannot say in advance whether in the famous shell, the irritation of the [grain of sand] will at the 
end create the pearl. (Teubner 2000: 409) 
 
In some cases organisations might accomplish a fundamental change. In other cases the 
ongoing practical discourses might hardly be affected: the organisation might use the new 
labels but without really changing its structures of communication. There are many empirical 
accounts in the management literature of such instances of pure re-labelling (e.g. Ashforth and 
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Gibbs 1990; Brunsson and Olsen 1993). While this is often portrayed as intentional deception, 
there are many cases where it is assumed by the organisation itself that the organisational 
practices have been changed: through the new labels, the organisational reality is experienced 
differently, even if it has not changed in any „substantial‟ way. 
 
The system-specific re-invention of a scientific concept is, however, only possible if the 
organisation finds some point of connection between its existing interpretational context and 
the label. That is, the different labels and sub-labels in some way or other must be open to 
being interpreted according to the existing interpretational context: the labels need 
„interpretive viability‟ (Benders and Van Veen 2001), i.e. they have to leave scope for 
interpretation.  Several authors have commented on the ambiguity and vagueness of scientific 
concepts or labels that are used in practice (e.g. Kieser 2002; Ortmann/Salzmann 2002; 
Nicolai 2004). While some authors see this ambiguity fairly critically, other authors have 
pointed out – in accordance with our systems-theoretical perspective – that only by being 
ambiguous and vague is there a chance of such concepts/labels being able to be made to „fit‟ 
the concrete organisational context. Astley and Zammuto write in this respect: 
 
Linguistic ambiguity […] gives conceptual terminology great flexibility of application, allowing 
words to take on new meanings in the context of a different language game. (Astley and 
Zammuto 1992: 453; emphasis added) 
 
Ambiguity allows the organisation to project the decision problems it encounters into a 
concept and thus interpret it as the solution to these pressing problems (Kieser 1997: 59; 
Kieser and Wellstein 2008) 
 
 22 
While in principle any scientific communication can have practical implications if the 
economic system or the business organisations react to them, the likelihood of causing such 
resonance can also be influenced by the scientific system. In line with this, Luhmann (1993) 
suggests conceptualising „applied science‟ as a science that contemplates, and tries to increase its 
potential for causing perturbations in practice. This contrasts with the widely held concept of „applied 
science‟ as a science whose findings are transferred into practice – which is impossible in principle. In 
other words, the scientific discourse might reflect on its potential for stimulating parallel processes 
in the practical discourse; for stimulating, that is, productive misunderstandings. This 
reflection can focus on the aspect of content or process. With respect to content, science 
might, for example, try to develop labels that are likely to have resonance also in the practical 
discourse. With respect to process, one might try to ensure that the process of research comes 
into „contact‟ with management practice. This might take, for instance, the form of the so-
called „mode 2 management research‟ (e.g. Gibbons et al. 1994). However, in contrast to the 
usual interpretation, „mode 2‟ would have to be understood as a parallel processing of 
separate discourses: the scientific discourse and the practical discourse take place at the same 
time, with the „same‟ communications meaning different things in the different discourses. 
 
6. Conclusion: implications for research policy 
 
In this chapter we tried to demonstrate the potential of Luhmann‟s theory of autopoietic social 
systems for illuminating the relation between management science and management practice. 
For this purpose we first introduced Luhmann‟s concept of social systems as operatively 
closed systems of communication. According to this view, science constitutes a particular 
system that is characterised by a particular logic of communication that differs fundamentally 
from that of the systems of „practice‟ – in this case: the economic system in general and 
business organisations in particular. Due to their different logics, scientific results cannot be 
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transferred to the other systems. However, this doesn‟t mean that science has no impact at all 
on practice: science can cause „perturbations‟ in other systems, which might change those 
systems‟ structures. We argued that whether science can have such an effect depends on the 
structures of the relevant systems. 
 
With regard to the current debate on the practical irrelevance of management science (e.g. 
Rynes et al. 2001; Baldridge et al. 2004; Van de Ven/Johnson 2006) this has important 
implications: from this systems-theoretical perspective, the lack of practical relevance needs 
to be understood not as a deficiency of the particular research but as an inevitable 
consequence of the incommensurability between the different discourses. In a strict sense, we 
might thus only speak of the relevance or irrelevance of research to further research – but not 
to practice. The implication of this is twofold: on the one hand, management research has to 
acknowledge its self-referentiality as constitutive. That is to say, management science – like 
all science – only progresses by focusing on the scientific discourse (cf. Kieser 2002; Kieser 
and Leiner 2009; Nicolai 2004). Thus, the „difference‟ or „gap‟ between management science 
and management practice, which has been deplored by so many management scholars as a 
problem that needs to be done away with, has to be appreciated as the sine qua non without 
which management science cannot constitute a science at all. If management science were 
adjusted to the logic of management practice, it would no longer constitute a science but 
simply be another form of management practice (Luhmann 1994; Kieser 2002). 
 
On the other hand, the scientific discourse could take into account that it has the potential to 
have resonance in the practical management discourses and thus constitute a fruitful source of 
perturbation (Astley and Zammuto 1992; Luhmann 1994; Seidl 2007). As such, management 
science could try to increase its potential for having some resonance in management practice. 
However, there are two dangers: first, due to the different logics of the science system and the 
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receiving systems, the former has no control over its effect on the latter; the perturbation 
might prove detrimental. In this respect, science one can only try to draw the attention of the 
receiving system to the fact that it is the receiving system itself that determines the effect of 
the scientific perturbation. Thus, science cannot be blamed for any detrimental effects that its 
concepts might have in practice. 
 
Second, if management research focuses too much on its effect on practice, it might lose its 
connectivity to other scientific communications; i.e. it might become disconnected from the 
network of scientific communications and thus no longer constitute an element of the 
scientific system (Luhmann 1994; Kieser 2002). In this respect, science might reflect on its 
own orientation with regard to internal and external „audiences‟ and try to strike some sort of 
balance. There are numerous examples of such reflections taking place in management science 
– this paper is an example of that. 
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